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Abstracts
De oorzakelijkheidsproblematiek is welbekend in het aansprakelijkheidsrecht. In
het verzekeringscontractenrecht daarentegen is hij in sommige rechtsstelsels,
zoals als het Belgische, omzeggens onbekend. Nochtans vindt hij zijn oorsprong in
het zeeverzekeringsrecht.
Conceptueel dient de oorzakelijkheid onderscheiden te worden van andere verban-
den, zoals de omstandigheid.
Het vraagstuk beperkt zich tot de dekkingsafbakening in tegenstelling tot het dek-
kingsverval en tot de gevallen van ondeelbare schade, waarvan de posten niet aan
een eigen oorzaak kunnen toegerekend worden.
De bijdrage onderzoekt of bij gebreke van een uitdrukkelijke wettelijke of conven-
tionele causaliteitsregel, de equivalentieleer ook toepassing kan vinden in het
transportverzekeringscontractenrecht en zoja met welke eventuele correcties voor
onwezenlijke gevolgen van de ongenuanceerde sine qua non regel, zoals zijn “alles
of niets” effect, de oorzakelijkheidsopheffende reserve-oorzaak, enz.
Daartoe worden de scenario’s van complexe causaliteit, zoals samenwerkende en
uiteenvolgende oorzaken, in combinatie met dekkingsuitsluiting en -insluiting
onderzocht.

La problématique de la causalité est bien connue en droit de la responsabilité. En
droit des contrats d’assurance par contre elle est quasi inconnue en certains sys-
tèmes juridiques, comme le droit belge.
Pourtant ses racines sont dans le droit des assurances maritimes.
Conceptuellement la causalité est à distinguer d’autres corrélations, comme les
rapports de circonstance.
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Le problème est limité à la définition de la couverture contrairement à la
décheance de la couverture et aux cas de dommage indivisible, dont les postes ne
peuvent être imputés à leur propre cause.
Cette contribution examine si à défaut de norme de causalité explicite dans la loi
ou dans le contrat, la théorie de l’équivalence s’applique également au droit des
contrats d’assurance transport et dans l’affirmative avec quelles corrections éven-
tuelles des suites irréelles de la règle sine qua non pure, comme son effet “tout-ou-
rien”, la cause de réserve supprimant la causalité, etc.
A cette fin sont examinés les scénarios de causalité complexe, comme les causes
co-opérantes et consécutives en combinaison avec les exclusions et inclusions de
couverture.

Causation is a well-known aspect of the law of civil liability.
In insurance contract law however the subject of causation is almost a blind spot
in some legal systems, like the Belgian. Yet its origin is to be found in marine insur-
ance.
From a conceptual point of view causation must be distinguished from other types
of correlation, like the circumstantial link.
The issue is limited to the definition of the cover as opposed to the forfeiture of the
cover and to the indivisible loss, the components of which cannot be attributed to
their own cause.
This paper examines whether for lack of an express statutory or contractual causa-
tion rule, the equivalence doctrine can be applied to transport insurance contract
law and if so subject to which possible adjustments to correct the unreal results of
the pure sine qua non rule, like its “all or nothing” effect, the causation lifting
reserve cause, etc.
For that purpose the complex causation scenarios are examined, like co-operating
and consecutive causes, combined with exclusion and inclusion of cover.
1. Introduction
1.1. Causation in other contexts
1. The issue of causation is particularly well-known in tort liability, where it
relates to the link between the fault and the damage in order to render the perpe-
trator liable (to pay compensation)1. To some extent, it is also acknowledged in
criminal liability2.
1 M. VAN QUICKENBORNE, De Oorzakelijkheid in het recht van de burgerlijke aansprakelijkheid (Brus-
sels: Elsevier, 1972), 1; H. HART and T. HONORE, Causation in the law (Oxford: Clarendon, 2nd
edition 1985), 84.
2 C. VAN DEN WYNGAERT, Strafrecht & strafprocesrecht in hoofdlijnen (Antwerpen: Maklu, 2011), 297-
303.
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1.2. Causation in the insurance cover
2. The causation issue may however also arise in contract law with respect to
the insurer’s primary performance duty. It is indeed characteristic for the insur-
ance contract that the insurer’s duty to perform (to pay the compensation)
depends on the causation of a covered type of damage by a covered type of peril.
An oversimplified example may illustrate this proposition.
If a covered type of damage (e.g. material loss) occurs and a covered type of peril
(e.g. fire) materialises, but if another (non covered) peril than the fire caused the
damage, the insurer will not be under a duty to perform.
1.3. Postulate: indivisible loss
3. The causation issue arises when the loss suffered is indivisible, i.e. when the
loss cannot be split up into components that may be linked to differential
factors.
When it is possible to distinguish component parts of the loss, that relate to
specific perils, there is no selection problem and hence no causation issue. If
multiple factors have caused, independently of each other, their own distinguish-
able loss items, there is no causal link between one factor and the loss item that
can be attributed to another factor3. In that case apportionment of the loss is
possible.
Whether the loss is divisible is a factual assessment. The inclination to qualify a
loss as divisible may be inspired by the wish to circumvent the equivalence
doctrine (cf. infra section 4.1.1.5.) in order to apportion the loss.
The resorting to attribution of flat-rate fractions or percentages of loss to the
respective concurrent causes is rather an indication of indivisibility of the loss.
Only the correlation between a nominal amount of loss in absolute figures and
a certain type of materialised risk, points to divisibility of the loss.
1.4. Definition of the problem
4. In order for a loss to be covered, it has to correspond to the precise charac-
teristics of the risk as defined in the law and/or in the contract in various
3 T. DORHOUT MEES, Het nieuwe verzekeringsrecht (1974), 103, nr. 7.159; Het nieuwe verzekerings-
recht (1980), 162, nr. 7.163; and Het nieuwe verzekeringsrecht, 81, nr. 199.
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respects. Those parameters are referred to as the so-called “dimensions” of the
cover (cf. infra section 2).
But in addition, those dimensions must be interlinked by the required correla-
tion, c.q. causal nexus.
Save the instances where the causal nexus is characterised by statute or by
contract (cf. infra section 4.1.2.1.), the causation rule in insurance contracts is
a blank norm4, that needs to be filled in.
Then the question also arises whether for lack of an express definition in the
statute or in the contract, the same causation regime and/or the same adjust-
ments and corrections to the basic “conditio sine qua non” test as in tort liability
apply to the primary insurer performance duty.
Even qualified causation regimes raise interpretation questions.
Finally the concrete effect of the causation rule requires illustration (cf. the
scenarios infra section 6).
1.5. Doctrines
5. In Common Law the causation in insurance contract law is a commonplace
and the subject of a mature doctrine5. This legal order has even codified the
causation rule in article 55 of the Marine Insurance Act (MIA) 1906, which
illustrates the importance that this legal order attaches to the issue.
In other (Civil Law) legal systems, like the Belgian and French (save in marine
insurance6, but even there case-law is scarce7), it is often a blind spot or at best
4 M. REINECKE, S. VAN DER MERWE, J. VAN NIEKERK and P. HAVENGA, General Principles of Insurance
Law (Durban: Lexis Nexis, 2002), 200, nr. 277; P. SWISHER, “Causation Requirements in Torts and
Insurance Law Practice: Demystifying some Legal Causation Riddles”, 43 Tort Trial & Ins. L.J. 2007,
1; H. BOCKEN and I. BOONE, “Causaliteit in het Belgisch Recht”, TPR 2002, 1673; L. SCHUERMANS,
Grondslagen van het Belgisch Verzekeringsrecht (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2nd edition 2008), 660,
nr. 892 refers to the equivalence theory without further explanation.
5 M. SONG, Causation in insurance contract law, Contemparty Commercial Law series, London,
Informa Law from Routledge, 2014, 188 p.
6 C. DIERYCK, Zeeverzekering en averijvordering (Brussels: Larcier, 2005), 128, nr. 199; R. DE SMET,
Traité théorique et pratique des assurances maritimes, (Paris: L.G.D.J., 1959), 249, nr. 230 et seq.;
H. LIBERT, “Zeeverzekeringen” in I. DE WEERDT, (ed.), Zeerecht, Grondbeginselen van het Belgisch
Privaatrechtelijk Zeerecht (Antwerp: ETL), I, 339-340, nr. 460; M. HUYBRECHTS, “Comparative
marine insurance law: Highlighting the significant features of marine insurance in Belgium and other
selected European legal systems” in D. THOMAS, (ed.) Marine Insurance: the law in transition
(London: Informa, 2006), Chapter 8, 167.
7 C. DIERYCK, o.c., l.c. refers to one (French) case only.
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only sporadically and fragmentarily addressed. In this respect Holland8 and
Germany9 form the exception.
1.6. Origin
6. Interestingly in all legal orders, the doctrine of insurance causation was first
developed in marine insurance and more specifically with respect to the war
peril, where it addressed the effect on the cover of the war peril as a concurrent
or consecutive cause or circumstance of the loss10.
Only later on it was also applied on other perils and in non-marine (land) insur-
ance.
1.7. Approach
7. The causation issue is not specific for transport insurance, as it is also relevant
in other insurance classes. But apart from its origin in transport insurance11 and
the express codification of the causation rule in the British Marine Insurance
Act12, the causation question may be more prominent in transport insurance,
because of the more dynamic nature of the risk in this insurance class as opposed
to the more static nature of the risk in other insurance classes.
Therefore this paper will focus on the subject matter specifically in transport
insurance.
For better understanding, the practical implications of the line of thought are
illustrated with examples from a transport insurance perspective.
8 J. OFFERHAUS, “Het oorzakelijk verband bij schadeverzekering”, RMT (Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn
Themis) 1944, 113; H. VOETELINK, Samenwerkende oorzaken in de schadeverzekering (Amsterdam:
Diligentia, 1952); T. DORHOUT MEES, Nederlands handels- en failissementsrecht, III* Het nieuwe
verzekeringsrecht (Arnhem: Gouda Quint, 1987), 79 v.; A. BLOM, Causaliteit in het Verzekeringsrecht
(Deventer: Kluwer, 2006); T. DORHOUT MEES, “Causaliteit en verzekering” in Verzekering en
Dorhout Mees, Preadvies 1998, Vereniging voor Verzekeringswetenschap (Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink,
1999), 39.
9 H.-U. BÜHLER, Die Auslegung privater Versicherungsverträge bei Vorliegen mehrerer Schadens-
ursachen, (Munich: Reuther, 1967); K. KURTZ-ECKHARDT, Causa proxima und wesentliche Bedingung
(Hamburg: Difo, 1977); A. HERDT, Die mehrfache Kausalität im Versicherungsrecht (Karlsruhe:
Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft, 1978).
10 T. DORHOUT MEES, “Causaliteit en verzekering” in Verzekering en Dorhout Mees, Preadvies 1998,
Vereniging voor Verzekeringswetenschap, Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink,1999, 30; A. BESSON, Les assu-
rances terrestres en droit français – Le contrat d’assurance (Paris, L.G.D.J., 4th edition 1975), 328, nr.
195. G. RIPERT, Droit Maritime (Paris: Rousseau, 4th edition, 1953) III, nr. 2683.
11 Cf. supra section 1.6.
12 Cf. supra section 1.5.
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The issue will be examined from a civil law and more precisely from a Belgian
law perspective, but where relevant, reference will be made to the situation in
other legal orders, including Common Law.
2. The dimensions of insurance cover
2.1. Perils, types of damage and other dimensions of the cover
8. In (transport) insurance the causation issue is usually addressed in terms of
the correlation nexus between on the one hand the covered type of damage
(material, immaterial, physical, consequential13, etc.) and on the other hand the
covered type of peril (fire, theft, storm, war, barratry, collision, etc.).
The famous “theory of the three dimensions”14 was invented for transport
insurance and includes the nature, the time and the place of the risk.
However the delimitation of the insurance cover is normally expressed also in
other dimensions: besides the nature of the peril and the type of the loss, there
are many more dimensions of the delimitation of the cover, where the causation
issue is also relevant.
2.2. Other dimensions
9. Such other dimensions and combinations of dimensions are:
• The time dimension (temporal):
In order for a loss to be insured, it must have occurred during the time frame
of the cover period (see e.g. art. 195 Belgian Maritime Code). A causation
issue arises when the indivisible loss was caused by the co-operative materi-
alisation of two perils, one of which is situated within and the other outside
of the window of the cover period or when a non-covered peril within the
cover period generates a covered peril outside the cover period (e.g. storm
leads to fire on board).
There is also an issue when a factor arises during the cover period and con-
tinues after the cover period or starts before the cover period and continues
during the cover period, in other words when it was effective partly during
and partly outside of the cover period.
13 E.g. a war risk insurance traditionally only covers physical loss, as expressed by the “frustration
clause”.
14 F. SOHR and G. VAN DOOSSELAERE, Les Assurances-Transport (Brussels: Puvrez, 1932), nr. 528 et seq.
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• The location dimension (spatial):
The causation issue arises when co-operative factors of a loss are respectively
situated within and outside the geographic scope of the cover or when a
factor operated partly in and partly outside the cover area.
• The identity of the stakeholder:
The causation issue may also arise with respect to the identity of the insured,
the liable person, the beneficiary entitled to compensation, etc. In third party
liability insurance the cover will in principle be excluded if the loss was not
caused by the (fault of the) insured, his servants or by (the defect of) his
property.
In case the loss was however caused by the joint error of both a third person
and the insured or his servants themselves, the causation issue arises.
The third party liability insurer will not be held to perform in case of damage
caused by the insured to his own property. In marine insurance in that case
the insured may be considered as a third person via the contract fiction of the
“sistership” clause. A clause of “cross-liability” may also guarantee the
cover for losses caused by one insured to another insured.
• The capacity of the insured:
The loss may only be covered if the insured acted in a specific capacity: as
contractual carrier, as actual carrier, as vessel owner, as operator, as char-
terer, etc.
E.g. the operator of a motor vessel or aircraft is not covered under his private
life third party liability insurance15.
• The activity, use, situation, condition, etc.:
E.g. motor third party liability insurance only covers the characteristic traffic
risk, i.e. the liability that flows from participation in road traffic (cf. infra
section 3.1.).
The movement of an excavator along the public road from one construction
site to another qualifies as a traffic risk, whereas the operation of the exca-
vator on the construction yard amounts to an entrepreneurial risk.
• The object or the thing insured
• Etc.
15 Art. 6, 14° and 15° Royal Decree 12 January 1984 on the private life third party liability insurance.
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2.3. The peril
The peril as an insurance cover dimension warrants some more comments.
2.3.1. Sometimes: irrelevance of the peril
10. The definition of the cover may be very broad, when the insurer’s duty to
perform is subject to very few conditions. When the insurance cover is not
subject to a particular cause of loss, also the causation issue does not arise.
To a certain extent an “all risks” insurance cover illustrates such a case, since
the peril that caused the loss is in principle irrelevant: the mere occurrence of the
loss triggers the insurer’s duty to perform. This example must be nuanced, as
even an all risks insurance cover generally still contains some exclusions from
the cover.
2.3.2. Terminological confusion
11. The risk is the (future) uncertain event as defined in all its dimensions: type
of peril, type of damage, time, place, etc.
The loss is the materialisation of the defined risk in all its dimensions.
The term “risk” is often and especially in colloquial language misused to refer
only to the concept of “peril” or to the object insured16.
3. Correlation other than causal
12. The required correlation between the components of the cover, viz. the
respective dimensions as defined in the delimitation of the cover (cf. supra
section 2), may be expressed as a causal nexus.
Although this correlation is often of a causal nature, it however is not necessar-
ily of a causal nature. It may also consist of a looser type of correlation17.
Causation expresses a rather strict relationship between the damage and the
peril or the other dimensions of the delimitation of the cover, based on the cause
and effect correlation: “caused by” (expressed retrospectively) or “effecting”
(expressed prospectively).
16 P. VANDERGETEN, “Les assurances dégâts matériels (incendie, périls connexes et autres périls)” in X.,
Les entreprises et leurs assurances (Mechelen, Kluwer, 2006), 189.
17 H. VOETELINK, Samenwerkende oorzaken in de schadeverzekering, 117.
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Correlations other than causal correlations to define the insurance cover are
more circumstantial. They are expressed in the following terms: “in the course
of”, “on the occasion of”, “pursuant to”, “in connection with”, “concerning”,
“in the context of”, “involved in” and even “made possible by” and “facilitated
by”, etc.
A circumstantial or involvement correlation between the loss and the fact, does
not equate to a causal correlation between the loss and the circumstance or
situation. A loss may be linked causally to a circumstance18 (cf. infra section
6.3.).
The occasion refers more to the passive environment in which the event occurs,
whereas the cause is a more self-acting factor.
Depending on whether it relates to an inclusion or an exclusion of cover (cf.
infra section 4.3.), the broader circumstantial relationship will respectively
extend or restrict, i.e. broaden or narrow the insurance cover.
The motive for a looser than a causal correlation may be inspired by the inten-
tion to alleviate the onus of proof in favour of one of the contract partners, when
the positive proof of a causal nexus is (too) difficult to bring. The correlation of
involvement, circumstance, context, etc. has the implied effect of a non-rebutta-
ble presumption of causation.
In transport insurance there are ample examples of circumstantial correlation.
The Institute Cargo Clauses (ICC) for the MAR policy in some instances define
the cover by expressing the correlation in terms of “reasonably attributable
to”19 in stead of “caused by”.
The correlation may also be based on a mere temporal or spatial criterion:
“during” or “in” or “in a radius or perimeter of” etc.20 without any causative
nature21.
A few more illustrations of such other correlations than causation in transport
insurance follow.
18 H. VOETELINK, Samenwerkende oorzaken in de schadeverzekering, 17.
19 H. BENNETT, The Law of Marine Insurance (Oxford:University Press, 2nd edition, 2006), 327.
20 See e.g. Western Cape High Court Cape Town (WCC) 25 October 2010, Witbooi vs Leandra Trans-
port CC & Another, case nr. 4280/2007, Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin 2010, 233.
21 This correlation must not be confused with the causation by a factor in the temporal or spatial dimen-
sion (cf. supra section 2.2.).
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3.1. In motor third party liability insurance
• Drivers license and age
Driving a motor vehicle without holding the required drivers license or
before having reached the required minimum age entails the loss of the third
party motor liability insurance cover in case of a road traffic accident.
The loss of cover however does not require a causal nexus between the acci-
dent and the lack of holding a drivers license or the too young age
(art. 25,3°b model policy motor third party liability insurance, Royal Decree
of 14 December 1992). The correlation is purely temporal as opposed to
causal.
• Characteristic road traffic risk:
Also in order for the motor third party liability insurance to cover the liable
motor vehicle driver, the vehicle must have been used in road traffic22,23.
The participation in road traffic is not a causal requirement but only a cir-
cumstantial condition.
The participation in the road traffic must not have caused the traffic acci-
dent: the traffic accident must only have occurred on the occasion of the
participation of the motor vehicle in the road traffic.
There must be a causal nexus between the wrongful use of the motor vehicle
and the damage, but not between the damage and the participation in the
road traffic.
• Involvement in a motor car accident:
In motor third party liability insurance, the “involvement” in an accident of
a motor vehicle triggers its motor third party liability insurer’s no-fault com-
pensation duty vis-à-vis the vulnerable (non-motorised) victim(s) (art. 29bis
Belgian Compulsory Motor Third Party Liability Insurance Act of
21 November 1989). It is not required that the motor vehicle has caused the
accident.
Of course the claim for compensation of damages against the motor third
party liability insurer will only be well founded if the loss was caused by the
event (c.q. collision) in which the motor vehicle was involved24.
22 Cf. supra the example of the excavator moving along the road as opposed to operating on the contruc-
tion yard.
23 See C. VAN SCHOUBROECK, G. JOCQUE, A. VANDERSPIKKEN and H. COUSY, “Overzicht van rechtspraak
verzekering motorrijtuigen 1980-1997”, TPR 1998, 102, et seq.
24 J. FAGNART, La causalité, 47 and his comment on Cass. 2 September 2005, T.Verz., 2006, 338.
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3.2. In marine insurance
• Perils at sea:
Also the concept “peril of the sea” as a cause of loss refers to perils at sea and
not necessarily of the sea.
According to article 201 of the Belgian Maritime Code, as adopted by article
1 of the Antwerp Marine Insurance Policy 1859, the insurer bears the losses
and damage from a series of named perils, followed by the ejusdem generis
provision “... and in general by any other peril of the sea”.
This concept of “peril of the sea” was interpreted as meaning not only
“caused by the sea” but also as “occurred at sea”25. This interpretation was
explained as follows26:
“Pour qu’il y ait fortune de mer, il n’est pas nécessaire que le sinistre
soit directement causé par la mer ou par une cause maritime; il suffit
que la mer soit le théâtre du sinistre pour que l’assureur soit respon-
sable envers l’assuré”.
Article 6.1. of the Antwerp Cargo Insurance Policy 2004 applied this inter-
pretation by covering the loss from a series of named perils, followed by the
clause: “… and, in general, from all accidents and perils at sea”.
The provision of article 201 Belgian Maritime Code adopts the wording of
article 350 of the French Commercial Code, according to which the perils of
the sea comprise not only the perils caused by the sea but also the events that
occur at sea. Perils are perils of the sea because they take place on the occa-
sion of the maritime voyage. In order to be covered, it suffices that the loss
took place at sea, in other words that the sea was the theatre of the loss.
When in order to be covered it is only required that the loss causing event
and consequently the loss occur at sea or on the occasion of the maritime
voyage, the causation requirement is watered down to a circumstantial cor-
relation, that is much looser than the strict causal nexus with a specific threat
that is qualified as a maritime peril. In a cover that is defined in a positive
manner (cf. infra section 4.3.), such a loose correlation benefits the insured,
because it extends the cover.
• Deviation:
The former article 31 Insurance Act 1874 (present art. 255 Belgian Insurance
Act 2014) exonerates the insurer of his duty to perform in case the risk is
25 R. DE SMET, Traité théorique et pratique des assurances maritimes, 249, nr. 230 et seq.
26 C. SMEESTERS and G. WINKELMOLEN, Droit maritime et droit fluvial, III, nr. 906.
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modified by the change of an essential circumstance at the hands of the
insured. This rule was adopted in marine insurance, where the insurer is
exonerated pursuant to the voluntary “change of journey, course or vessel”
(deviation) by the insured (art. 205 and 218 Belgian Maritime Code). Unless
it is qualified as a gross negligence that entails forfeiture of cover (cf. infra
section 5.1.) as opposed to non-cover (exclusion), because it is beyond the
delimitation of the cover, the exoneration of the insurer in case of deviation
does not require any causal nexus between the loss and the altered circum-
stance. The insurer is not under a duty to perform, even if the loss would
have happened equally without the deviation.
For the sake of comparison: in the British marine insurance law deviation
lifts the insurance cover totally (art. 46 MIA).
• War:
The ordinary insurance law distinguishes the normal perils from the war
peril for the purpose of excluding from the cover by virtue of the law the
losses caused by war27.
In land insurance only the loss caused by the war is in principle excluded
from the cover.
Consequently in land insurance the loss that occurred during the war, but
that was not caused by the war, is not excluded from the cover.
Marine insurance distinguishes between the act of war (“fait de guerre”) and
the state of war (“état de guerre”)28. The two concepts do not coincide. Dur-
ing the war a loss may also be caused by an event different from war.
Apart from the exclusion from the cover of the loss caused by an act of war
(art. 19 former Insurance Act 1874, present art. 243 Insurance Act 2014),
article 202 of the Belgian Maritime Code by virtue of the law terminates the
marine insurance cover in war circumstances29. The termination of the cover
exceeds the mere exclusion from the cover. From that moment on the insur-
ance contract no longer provides any cover at all, not against perils of war
and not against the normal perils of the sea either.
In war circumstances the cover, both against ordinary perils of the sea and
against war perils, is to be provided by a war insurance cover (art. 204 Bel-
gian Maritime Code), if any.
27 The war peril may be covered by an express stipulation (art. 19 former Insurance Act 1874, present
art. 243 Insurance Act 2014 and former art. 9 Land Insurance Contract Act 1992, present art. 63
Insurance Act 2014).
28 G. RIPERT, Droit Maritime III, 662, nrs. 2683 and 2685; R. DE SMET, Droit maritime et droit fluvial
belges (Brussels: Larcier, 1971), 897, nr. 783.
29 C. DIERYCK, Zeeverzekering en averijvordering, 131, nr. 201.
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In that case, the effect of co-operative causes (cf. infra section 4.2.2.), of
which one consists of a war peril and the other of a covered peril, is not an
issue any more, because the correlation is not of a causative but of a circum-
stantial nature. The insurer’s exoneration does not require that the loss is
caused by a war peril, but merely that the loss occurred in a war situation.
The factor of exclusion as a means of defining the cover is purely circumstan-
tial and not causative.
In this negative definition of the cover, the looser correlation benefits the
insurer. The motive for this arrangement lies in the general increase of the
risk30 that distorts the contract equilibrium pursuant to the war situation,
without the possibility for the insurer to bring the positive proof that the loss
was effectively caused by the war.
In this respect the conceptual distinction between “act of war” and “state of
war” is a relevant issue, that however cannot be elaborated on in this paper.
4. Causation
13. Besides the dimensions of the insurance cover (cf. supra section 2) also their
mutual correlation, expressed in terms of a causal nexus, determines the
insurer’s duty to perform. The outcome of the causation test depends on three
elements:
• the applicable causation rule;
• the modality of concurrence of the factors (the causation tree);
• the positive or negative formulation of the definition of the insurance cover.
4.1. The causation rule
14. A distinction is to be made between the factual causality rule (“cause-in-
fact”) and the legal causation rule (“legal cause”).
For that purpose some digression on causation in general beforehand may prove
useful.
4.1.1. Factual causation: “conditio sine qua non” test
15. The factual causality is established by applying the “conditio sine qua non”
or “causa sine qua non” test, also referred to as the “but-for” test. This rule to
30 Due to the war situation vessels may steam at higher speed, without navigation lights, via other
unusual routes, etc.
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establish factual (as opposed to legal: cf. infra section 4.1.2.) causation is gener-
ally accepted in most legal systems31.
The causal relationship is characterised by necessity: it means that without the
causal factor the damage would not have occurred or would not have occurred
in the same manner. Conversely there is no causality if the damage would
equally have happened and in the same manner without the considered factor.
The lack of causation means that (an)other factor(s), different from the consid-
ered factor, were available that would have been sufficient to cause the same
damage and thus rendering the considered factor irrelevant. The test consists of
the check whether the same damage would have occurred by imagining the
absence of the considered factor. If this is the case, it means that there is another
parallel, reserve cause (cf. infra section 4.2.1.).
4.1.1.1. Incidence of the degree of abstraction or concreteness
16. As the causality is determined by the fact that the damage would not have
been the same without the factor considered, the causation test consists of the
comparison between the reality and the imaginary absence of the considered
factor.
The causation depends on the degree of abstraction or concreteness of the loss
and the cause.
Concreteness of the loss and abstraction of the cause extend the causal nexus.
Vice-versa abstraction of the loss and concreteness of the cause restrict the
causal nexus.
The more abstract (i.e. the more general or the vaguer) the loss is defined, the
easier it is to conclude that another cause would have caused the same loss,
which implies the absence of a causal nexus with the considered factor on the
basis of the “conditio sine qua non” test.
The more concrete (i.e. in terms of the dimensions of time, place, nature, etc.)
the loss is defined, the more difficult it is to conclude that exactly the same
damage (identical in all its characteristics) would have occurred pursuant to
another factor than the considered factor. The more concrete or precise the caus-
ing factor is defined, the easier it will be to identify a different cause that would
31 H. HART and T. HONORE, Causation in the law, i.a. 90, 109 and 128; M. VAN QUICKENBORNE, De
Oorzakelijkheid, 187.
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have caused the same damage, which implies the absence of causal nexus with
the considered factor according to the “conditio sine qua non” test.
4.1.1.2. Effective, not hypothetical reserve factor
17. In order to lift the causality with the considered factor, the other sufficient
factor(s) must however be real and effective and not just hypothetical.
The reality cannot be rewritten. A mere hypothetical parallel (reserve) cause
could not lift the causality with the considered factor32.
4.1.1.3. Causal factor indispensible, reserve factor sufficient
18. In order for it to be causal, the considered factor must be indispensible to
bring about the loss. It means that without that factor the damage would not
have occurred (in the same manner) (cf. supra).
The causal factor must however not necessarily be sufficient to cause the effect.
It may be insufficient by itself and require the co-operation of another factor. A
factor does not lose its causal capacity because the loss requires the combination
of that factor with another factor. The causal factor must not necessarily be the
sole factor to cause the loss. The damage does not need to be a necessary conse-
quence of the causal factor all by itself.
The reserve factor that lifts the causal nexus between the considered factor and
the loss on the contrary must be a sufficient factor to cause the loss all by itself33.
4.1.1.4. Transitivity
19. This “conditio sine qua non” system is characterised by transitivity: the
cause of the cause is the cause of the consequence: “causa causae est causa
causati”.
In a chain of causes, even the original, first, most remote (causa remota) cause
is causative for the damage. The causal nexus is not lifted because there are
intermediate links34.
32 M. VAN QUICKENBORNE, Oorzakelijk verband tussen onrechtmatige daad en schade, (Mechelen:
Kluwer, 2007), 47.
33 M. VAN QUICKENBORNE, Oorzakelijk verband tussen onrechtmatige daad en schade, 150.
34 H. HART, and T. HONORE, Causation in the Law, 354.
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The causal link between the initial cause and the ultimate loss only requires that
upon each intermediate transition the “but for” test is met, i.e. that the preced-
ing factor was indispensible to trigger the ensuing subsequent factor.
4.1.1.5. Equivalence
20. As they are each held fully causative for the consequences, all concurrent
indispensible causes are considered equivalent.
The equivalence of indispensible causes entails two consequences:
• there is no prevalence;
• there is no apportionment.
4.1.1.5.1. No gradation as to intensity
21. Contrary to some other (qualified) causation regimes (cf. infra section
4.1.2.1.), the pure causation rule based on the “but for” test, does not probe the
intensity or the relative effect or impact of the cause(s): it does not look for the
“original” or “primary” or ‘first” (“causa remota”) or “last” or “closest” or
“proximate” (“causa proxima”) or “immediate” or “main” or “effective”
(“causa causans”) etc. cause.
Other causation systems may thus select e.g. the dominant cause as the legally
relevant factor (thereby disregarding all other causes with lesser effect, even if
they are indispensable).
As the term “equivalence” indicates, all factors are considered equally causative,
provided they are indispensible. Since all co-operative causes are equally causa-
tive, there is no gradation as to their intensity35.
4.1.1.5.2. No Apportionment
22. On the basis of the postulate of equivalence of all indispensible causes,
causation is a matter of all or nothing: there is a causal nexus with a factor or
there is none36.
Partial causation is inconceivable37 and hence the apportionment of the causa-
tion is not possible. Every causal factor is considered to be a full blown cause.
35 M. VAN QUICKENBORNE, De Oorzakelijkheid, 207, nr. 361; Oorzakelijk verband tussen onrechtmatige
daad en schade, 15, nr. 17.
36 M. STORME, T.Verz 1990, 444 = Verkeersrecht 1990, nr. 2.
37 J. FAGNART, La causalité, (Waterloo: Kluwer, 2009), 15, nr. 29.
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Contrary to some other causation systems, this doctrine of equivalence does not
allow commensurate imputation of a loss to the respective co-operative causa-
tive factors.
4.1.1.6. No simultaneity required
23. The concurring causes must in principle not necessarily occur simultane-
ously in order to qualify as causal factors to the loss. They may be spread in the
time order.
4.1.2. Legal causation
24. The legal causation regime may adjust and correct the factual causality rules
for motives of fairness and public policy, in order to achieve effects that are soci-
etally more acceptable or ideologically more in line with the legal order, than the
pure factual causation rule expressed by the “but for” test.
This adjustment or correction may flow from express statutory or contractual
provisions (cf. infra on the characterised (qualified) causation rules) (cf. infra
section 4.1.2.1.) or from a generally accepted regime by jurisprudence and
doctrine (cf. infra section 5.2.: the equivalence, preponderance, proportional
approaches).
4.1.2.1. Qualified causation regime
25. The enacted law and/or the insurance contract may qualify the required
causal nexus.
The instances where this occurs, are however rather scarce.
The general causation system may apply a characterised nexus, such as the
dominant or proximate cause.
Article 55 of the British Marine Insurance Act (MIA) 1906 specifies the causal
nexus as the “proximate cause”. In its ruling of 31 January 1918 in the Ikaria
case38 the House of Lords refined this correlation by substituting the “proxi-
mate cause in efficiency” for the “proximate cause in time”.
38 The Ikaria, House of Lords, 31 January 1918, Leyland Shipping Co Ltd. vs Norwich Union Fire
Insurance Society Ltd., (1918) A.C. 350, p. 369.
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The changes introduced by the Insurance 2015 to amend the Marine Insurance
Act 1906, do not affect the issue of causation in the primary performance duty
of the insurer. They are only relevant in the forfeiture of cover as a sanction for
a breach of a contractual duty of disclosure or for a non compliance with a
warranty39.
When the legal precept is not mandatory, party autonomy allows the contract
partners to freely stipulate the type of causal nexus of their preference. Contract
terms in model policies or standard insurance conditions sometimes diverge
from the legal causation rule.
E.g. the German DTV40-Kaskoclauseln (Clause 27) and the Norwegian Insur-
ance Plan (NIP) (paragraph 2-13) stipulate the apportionment of a loss amongst
co-operative causes.
26. Other traditional examples of express statutory or contractual qualification
of the causation rule are as follows. Even their exact meaning may also require
interpretation.
• Directly-Indirectly caused by:
In transport insurance, the wording “directly caused by act of war” is tradi-
tionally stipulated41.
In its normal sense, the term “directly” means that there are no intermediate
factors between the considered cause and the loss, i.e. without any other
intervening factors.
In another context it was ruled42 that the term “direct” loss implies a link
between the triggering event and the loss without any other intervening fact,
such as the own fault of the victim, the act of a third person or force majeure.
The latter interpretation of the term “direct” seems more sensible than its
twisted meaning of mere indispensability in the context of contractual liabil-
ity (art. 1151 Civil Code)43, which still allows other intervening factors.
39 How it used to be: “A breach of warranty is operative even though not causative of the loss”: see
R. MERKIN, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1990), 129, nr. 6-27. How it
is now: art. 33 (3) MIA 1906, expressing the immateriality of the warranty to the risk, was abolished.
40 Deutsche Transport-Versicherer (German Transport Insurers).
41 J. OFFERHAUS, RMT 1944, 134.
42 Cass. 5 October 2006, RW 2009-2010, 359.
43 Cass. 9 May 1986, Arr.Cass. 1985-86, nr. 555, 1223 = RW 1986-87, 2699 = TBH, 1987, 413, note
D. DEVOS = JT 1987, 162; P. VAN OMMESLAGHE, “Examen de Jurisprudence: les obligations”, RCJB
1986, 219-220, discussing Cass. 24 June 1977, Pas. I, 1087. Cass. 14 October 1985, Arr.Cass. 1985-
86, nr. 88, 179 = RCJB 1988, 341, note M. VAN QUICKENBORNE.
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A contrario the term “indirectly” means that there are one or more interme-
diate factors between the considered cause and the loss. It is recalled that
pursuant to the indispensability requirement (the “but for” test), the inter-
vening other factors do not lift the causal nexus.
Also in aviation insurance the clause “caused directly or indirectly by” is
encountered.
In the regime of the “conditio sine qua non” test, the stipulation in transport
insurance that the loss must result from both “the direct or indirect effect of”
(“résultant des effets directs ou indirects de…”)44 does not add anything to
the definition of the causal nexus.
Article 11.2.6. of the Antwerp Cargo Insurance Policy 2004 translates “indi-
rect” losses, damages and costs in the Dutch text by “consequential” losses,
damage, and expenses in the English text45.
It is questionable whether the terms of “indirect” damage and “consequen-
tial” damage are interchangeable, as in terms of causation consequential loss
may result directly, i.e. without any intervening other factors, from the mis-
hap.
In the context of insurance contract law (as opposed to tort liability) the
question arises whether by this other factor is meant an expressly named
factor (defined in the contract or the law) or any other factor (cf. infra sec-
tion 4.1.2.2.).
• Mediate-immediate cause of:
To the extent that “mediate” is to be understood as a synonym for “indi-
rect”, it does not add anything to the causation issue in the equivalence sys-
tem, where also an indirect cause is a relevant cause, provided it is indispen-
sible (cf. supra).
According to some opinions the nuance between “directly” and “immedi-
ately” lies in the distinction between the causation and the time orders46.
The wording of article 18 former Insurance Act 1874 (presently art. 242
Insurance Act 2014) uses the terms: “immediately resulting from” (in
French: “résultant immédiatement de”) for the purpose of excluding from
the cover the inherent defect of the thing insured.
This term “immediately” was interpreted as “exclusively” in the sense that a
loss caused by the combined effect of the inherent defect and another (cov-
44 P. BRUNAT, Lamy Transport, I, 4ième partie, Assurance-transport, nr. 664.
45 Cf. F. PONET, De goederenverzekeringspolis van Antwerpen (Mechelen: Kluwer, 2008), 94.
46 Brussels 14 February 2000, RGAR 2001, nr. 13423 and nr. 13464; Brussels 8 March 2000, TBH
2001, 192.
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ered) peril, is to be borne by the insurer47. The drafting history of the law
clarifies that the term “immediately” was used in the sense of “not merely
indirectly”, viz. that the inherent defect has caused the loss all by itself48.
Consequently this provision of article 18 former Insurance Act 1874 does
not allow to apportion the loss amongst the co-operating factors (inherent
defect and other peril).
• Exclusively-partly caused by:
The concept of “exclusive” in the sense of “sole/unique” cause as opposed
to the “conjoint” cause in principle does not require much further clarifica-
tion.
The difference between the exclusive or sole cause on the one hand and the
direct cause on the other hand is clear from a linguistic point of view.
The term “exclusive” (factor) is the opposite of co-operative (factor) (impact
of another indispensible factor). The term “exclusive” refers to the absence
of the co-operation of another cause.
The term “direct” is the opposite of consequential causes, (chain causation
through metamorphosis into another type of cause under the influence of
external factors) (cf. infra section 4.2.3.). It refers to the absence of chain
causation with transformation of a cause into another appearance.
This view is in line with the ruling of the Supreme Court that the concept of
direct damage means that between the causing factor and the damage, there
is no other intervening fact, but that this does not imply that the damage was
caused by only one single fact49.
• Wholly or partly caused by:
The terminology “wholly or partly caused by” is to be understood as refer-
ring to a scenario of multiple causation, more precisely as a case of co-oper-
ative causes (cf. infra section 4.2.2.).
Article 11 of the Antwerp Cargo Insurance Policy 2004 defines the exclu-
sions from the cover in terms of “directly or indirectly, wholly or partly
caused by or arising from...”
47 F. MONETTE, A. DE VILLE and R. ANDRE, Traité des Assurances Terrestres, 414, nr. 302.
48 Rapport des Commissions réunies de la Justice et des Finances, chargées d’examiner le Projet de Loi
contenant les titres X et XI, Livre 1er du Code de Commerce, Senate, session of 6 March 1873, nr. 43,
art. 18.
49 Cass. 18 January 2007, nr. C.06.0110.F/6.
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• Combinations of causal correlations.
As illustrated by the excerpts from policy wordings quoted above, sometimes
those characterised causal correlations are combined.
4.1.2.2. Open or closed category of causes
27. Factors causing the loss may be expressly named in the enacted law or in the
policy, either as covered or as excluded; they may also not be mentioned in the
policy and are therefore in an implied manner not covered, nor excluded.
Whereas tort liability takes into account all possible wrongful acts, conducts,
behaviours, attitudes, omissions, etc. and c.q. defects and vices that may have
effected the loss, insurance law works with a closed category of a limited
number of “named” (defined) causative factors, that are expressly referred to in
the enacted law and/or in the contract. At least this is true in an equivalence
causation regime (cf. infra section 6.4.) context and save the case of the parallel
(reserve) cause, that all by itself was also sufficient to cause the loss.
A regime based on the characterised (e.g. dominant) nature of the cause, also
takes into consideration causes of the loss, that are not expressly mentioned in
the statutory insurance law and/or the contract.
4.2. Modality of concourse of causes: the causation tree
28. In the situation where only one single (“unique”) factor caused the loss
(singular causation) directly without intermediate links, this factor is both neces-
sary but also sufficient.
This situation does not create any causation issues because it does not raise any
selection question. This theoretical case is rather exceptional, not to say inexistent.
Usually causality is plural, complex, composite: multiple concurring causes trig-
ger the loss.
29. Different modalities of multiple causality can be distinguished: they may be
(i) parallel, (ii) consecutive, (iii) co-operative or (iv) combinations of the latter.
The relevance of the multiple causation is clear for some of those causes may be
covered under the insurance contract and others may be excluded. The question
then arises what will be the effect of concurrence of causes on the insurer’s duty
to perform.
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The causation rule (cf. supra section 4.1.) will offer the selection criterion to
determine which of the concurring causes are relevant and thus must be taken
into account for the coverage test.
4.2.1. Parallel causes
30. Concurrent causes may be parallel: in that case each one of the concurring
causes independently all by itself is sufficient to bring about the loss, so that the
concurrent causes mutually render each other superfluous. As the “but for” test
(cf. supra section 4.1.1.) requires indispensability of the factor, the parallel
causes are reciprocally reserve causes.
In the absence of one cause, the same loss would have happened any way, due
to the other (parallel) cause.
Consequently the considered parallel cause is not indispensible and for that
reason not causative.
A special case of parallel causation arises when the loss requires the co-opera-
tion of any 2 out of 3 effective factors. The considered factor is insufficient
because the bringing about of the loss requires the co-operation between at least
2 factors. The considered factor is also dispensable, because the co-operation
between the 2 other of the 3 effective factors suffices to cause the loss. In that
situation the same reasoning applies for each of the 3 factors separately. The
dispensability of the considered factor entails its lack of causal nexus with the
loss.
It is a special case of cumulative causation.
The straightforward application of the “but for test” to parallel causes may
generate an unrealistic result and call for adjustment of the system (e.g. appor-
tionment: cf. infra section 5.3.3.).
In the time order this parallel causation can be either simultaneous or sequential:
the reserve cause may occur at the same moment as the cause considered or
subsequently one after the other (the “superseding cause” or “intervening
cause”, the “novus actus interveniens”)50.
Parallel causation can either be cumulative (the causes have physically impacted
on the loss) or potential (if one cause would not have existed, the other would
50 R. MERKIN, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1990), 91.
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have impacted on the loss, but could not impact because the first cause already
did so).
4.2.1.1. Cumulative causality
31. The parallel causes may materialise effectively. This situation is referred to
with the term of “cumulative causality”.
E.g. an (either or not simultaneous) fire and bombing without mutual relation-
ship were each sufficient to cause the total destruction of the thing insured.
The relevance of the situation is clear when one of those perils is included in the
cover and the other excluded from the insurance cover, or even when they are
both covered in case the regime of the cover differs according to the causing
peril.
4.2.1.2. Potential causality
32. The reserve cause may also be caught up by the considered cause: although
it existed in the bud (“in semine”) and would have equally caused the damage,
it could not have any impact any more, because its effect in the time order was
overtaken by the considered cause, that had already brought about the loss. This
situation is referred to with the term of “potential causality”51.
Examples in transport insurance are legion: e.g. in case of deviation (of voyage,
route, vessel), when the loss of the vessel and/or the cargo would have occurred
any way, regardless the deviation, at the respective geographic locations or
moments in time; the same reasoning applies when the later confiscation would
have caused the loss of a damaged or destroyed consignment of goods any way;
another example is the case where the stolen goods would have been destroyed
any way by fire later that day or the day after52.
4.2.2. Co-operative causes
33. Co-operative causes are concurring causes, the effect of which was indispen-
sible for the occurrence of the loss. Both (all) co-operating factors were neces-
sary in order to bring about the loss. Separately the co-operative causes would
51 M. VAN QUICKENBORNE, Oorzakelijk verband tussen onrechtmatige daad en schade, 150.
52 Cf. T. DORHOUT MEES, Nederlands handels- en failissementsrecht, III* Het nieuwe verzekeringsrecht
(Arnhem: Gouda Quint, 7th edition 1980), 163.
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not have had this effect. Without one of them, the loss would not have happened
(in the same manner).
E.g. a storm in combination with the vessel’s technical defect may cause the loss,
it being understood that either one of the two factors all by itself would have
been insufficient to cause the loss.
This term also covers the situation where causes reciprocally have a catalysing
effect on each other or where they constitute the factor of marginal excess of
threshold or critical values (of pollution, stress, concentration, temperature,
weight, humidity, pressure, speed, etc.): the co-operative cause may be the
proverbial “straw that breaks the camel’s back”.
Again the situation of co-operative causes is relevant when one (or some) of the
collaborating factors are included in and others are excluded from the insurance
cover.
4.2.3. Consequential causes (chain causation)
34. Chain causation is a linear (unbranched) causation.
Consecutive or consequential causes53 are causes that undergo a metamorpho-
sis: a cause of one type gives rise to or transforms into a cause of another type.
E.g. the Master’s navigation error may cause the vessel to enter into a storm
area, where the brutal movements cause fire on board, affecting the control of
the vessel, due to which the ship becomes adrift, causing delay in its arrival,
thereby damaging the perishable cargo carried.
Other examples are: an insured peril causes delay, that leads to loss (cf.
art. 11.2.4. Antwerp Cargo Insurance Policy 2004); or a fire or traffic accident
(e.g. a collision) cause delay or increase the temperature or humidity of the
cargo, that leads to damage to or delay of the goods (art. 5.2. CMR Policy); or
a navigation error causes the vessel to enter a storm area, due to which there is
machinery break down, which leads to collision, causing in its turn fire on board
and finally the loss; an act of war may cause fire, that destroys the thing insured;
the vehicle’s own defect causes a collision that causes a fire or an explosion, etc.
Again the relevance is clear when some of those causes in the chain of events are
included in or excluded from the insurance cover.
53 Probably the term “consequential causes” would express even more accurately the concept.
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4.2.4. Network or web causation
35. Chain causation and co-operative causation may also be combined.
In this scenario the transformation of a factor of one type into a factor of
another type does not occur in a linear manner, as it requires the lateral impact
of another co-operative factor.
In that case causation is not a chain, but a “web” or “net”, as there are also
factors that impact laterally on the transformation of one type of cause into
another type of cause.
That is why this situation is referred to with the term “web” or “network”
causation54.
4.3. The positive or negative definition of the cover
36. The delimitation of an insurance cover may be expressed in a positive or
negative manner.
This distinctive approach is very well known from the contrast between e.g. “all
risks” as opposed to “named perils” covers.
The former contains a negative list of excluded (i.e. non covered) perils. The
latter only contains an exhaustive positive list of included (i.e. covered) perils.
Besides its effect on the distribution (c.q. reversal) of the burden of proof, the
relevance of the positive or negative cover delimitation lies in the field of causa-
tion.
The positively or negatively formulated delimitation of the cover combined with
a characterised causation link or other correlation (either relaxing or tightening
the correlation) has a major impact on the extent of the insurance cover.
If there is a causal nexus between the loss and the excluded peril, the insurer will
be exonerated, even if there is also a causal nexus between the loss and an
included peril (cf. section 5.4.).
A relaxation or tightening of the correlation between the peril and the loss will
benefit the insured or the insurer depending on whether the insurance cover
respectively is defined in a positive or negative manner.
54 See Lord SHAW OF DUNFERMINE in The Ikaria, House of Lords, 31 January 1918, Leyland Shipping Co
vs Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd., (1918) A.C. 350, 369: “Causation is not a chain, but
a net”.
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5. Tentative submissions
5.1. The primary and secondary insurance contract duties: the 
summa divisio
37. A fundamental distinction (“summa divisio”) must be made between on the
one hand the issue of inclusion or exclusion on the basis of the delimitation of
the insurance cover and on the other hand the forfeiture of the cover pursuant
to a breach of a contract duty committed by the insured/policy holder (e.g. a
gross negligence).
The distinction between the exclusion from the insurance cover and the forfei-
ture of the insurance cover is however not always clear-cut: see the dispute on
the qualification of the intentional loss either as an exclusion or a forfeiture of
insurance cover55; deviation (see supra section 3.1.) and inherent defect (cf. infra
section 6.7) may also give rise to forfeiture in stead of exclusion, if qualified as
a case of gross negligence; finally an artificial qualification of a cause of loss as
an exclusion in the insurance contract may be re-qualified as a case of forfeiture
by the court, if it feels that this qualification corresponds better with its genuine
nature56.
The delimitation of the cover is of another order than the insured’s liability for
breach of contract pursuant to his shortcoming.
Pursuant to exclusion of cover no claim for cover can arise.
Forfeiture of cover implies that a virtually acquired cover is lost.
Consequently the delimitation test is in principle to precede the forfeiture test.
Due to the wrongful breach of his duties, the insured is in principle liable to
compensate the prejudice caused to his contract partner, the insurer (art. 1142
Civil Code).
As the insurer’s prejudice consists of paying out the insurance indemnity, the
insured’s characterised shortcoming that caused the loss, justifies the forfeiture
of the cover.
55 P. HENRY and J. TINANT, “Déchéance ou exclusion: de charybde en scylla” in B. DUBUISSON and
P. JADOUL (eds.), La loi du 25 juin 1992 sur le contrat d’assurance terrestre, dix années d’application
(Louvain-la-Neuve, Bruylant-Academia, 2003), 92; C. VAN SCHOUBROECK, G. JOCQUE, A. DE GRAEVE
and M. DE GRAEVE, “Overzicht van rechtspraak, Wet op de landverzekeringsovereenkomst (1992-
2003)”, TPR 2003, 1864 et seq.
56 See e.g. Gent 15 February 2007, NJW 2007, 415, note G. JOCQUE.
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The chronology of the implementation of this forfeiture may differ according to
the case at hand: either the insurer refuses to pay out the insurance indemnity or
he claims the reimbursement of a compensation already paid out before.
E.g. in the context of a third party liability insurance, the chronology is often
inverted: the insured’s claim for cover may be replaced by the third party liability
insurer’s recourse action against the insured (who had committed a character-
ised shortcoming), after compensation of the victim pursuant to a direct action
combined with non-opposable defences.
It is stressed that the insured’s breach of a contract duty, that causes the forfei-
ture of the cover, in principle is a characterised (a qualified) shortcoming, as
insurance normally intends to cover also the harmful effect of the insured’s own
errors57. This is especially true in third party liability insurance, that covers the
financial impact of the insured’s mistakes.
The legal consequences of exclusion and forfeiture may be different, e.g. on the
level of the onus of proof58 and also with respect to the causation regime.
As mentioned, a breach of contract (e.g. a characterised fault, such as a gross
negligence) by a contract partner (in casu the insured) gives rise to contractual
liability as defined by the enacted law and/or by the contract in the form of the
total or partial forfeiture of the cover.
In principle the causation regime for contractual liability is the same as for
extra-contractual liability59. For that reason this aspect will not be studied in
further detail here.
Whether the causation regime for the nexus between the peril and the damage
in the insurer’s primary performance duty, is the same as for tort liability, is a
query that will be addressed below (section 5.2.).
57 Except e.g. art. 206 Belgian Maritime Code, that also sanctions the insured’s minor fault with forfei-
ture of the cover.
58 M. FONTAINE, “Déchéances, exclusions, définition du risque et charge de la preuve en droit des assur-
ances”, RCJB 2003, 60; M. FONTAINE, Verzekeringsrecht (Brussels: Larcier, 2011), 284, nr. 352.
59 On the basis of articles 1150 and 1151 Civil Code; Cass. 9 May 1986, Arr.Cass. 1985-86, nr. 555,
1223 = RW 1986-87, 2699 = TBH, 1987, 413, note D. DEVOS = JT 1987, 162; P. VAN OMMESLAGHE,
“Examen de Jurisprudence: les obligations”, RCJB 1986, 219-220, discussing Cass. 24 June 1977,
Pas. I, 1087; H. BOCKEN and I. BOONE, TPR 2002, 1633; M. VAN QUICKENBORNE, Oorzakelijk
verband tussen onrechtmatige daad en schade, 25.
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5.2. Filling in the blank causation norm
38. The tort liability causation systems in the respective legal orders differ: e.g.
in Belgium it is the equivalence system; in France the dominant or preponderant
cause (“Théorie de la cause déterminante”)60; in Germany the adequate cause
system (“Adäquanz” )(taking into account the degree of probability or forseea-
bility of the loss)61; in Holland the reasonable attribution or imputation
(“toerekening naar redelijkheid”)62, etc.
When the enacted insurance contract law and/or the contract do not expressly
formulate the causation rule, the question however is whether the tort liability
causation rule also applies in the insurance contract law context.
There are ample conflicting arguments for and against. It is a dilemma.
An argument in favour of the analogous63 application is provided by the maxim
“Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus”.
Brewer64 stated:
“… it is generally taken to be beyond dispute that proximate cause is
proximate cause, wherever it may be found, and the court is content
with a brief definition in the traditional [tort] manner. The rule in
insurance cases appears to be that the definition of proximate cause,
which should be applied, is the same or substantially the same as in
negligence cases.”
Reinecke and Van der Merwe65 observed:
“if no other intention appears from the contract, it must be assumed
that the reference to causation was intended prima facie to bear the
meaning which is attached to the concept in other areas of law”
An argument against is provided by the specificity of legal branches: although
tort law and insurance contract law share the objective of restoration of the loss
for the prejudiced party, their context and inspiration are different.
60 J. OFFERHAUS, RMT 1944, 134 and G. RIPERT, Droit Maritime, III, 660, nr. 2682.
61 T. DORHOUT MEES, Het nieuwe verzekeringsrecht (1987), 77.
62 J. WANSINK, N. VAN TIGGELE, and F. SALOMONS, Mr. C. Asser’s Handleiding tot de beoefening van het
Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht, 7. Bijzondere overeenkomsten. Deel IX, Verzekering (Deventer: Kluwer,
2012), 445.
63 E. SCHLEMMER, “Oorsaaklikheid in die verzekeringsreg”, TSAR 1997 (3), 537-538; See the opinion of
P. SWISHER, 43 Tort Trial & Ins. L.J. 2007, (1) 18.
64 W. BREWER, “Concurrent Causation in Insurance Contracts”, 59. Mich. L. Rev. 1961, 1167.
65 M. REINBECKE, S. VAN DER MERWE, J. VAN NIEKERK and P. HAVENGA, General Principles of Insurance
Law, (Durban: Lexis Nexis, 2002), 200, nr. 277.
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Insurance cover is the result of a contractual relationship, that – except for
mandatory contract law – is to a large extent freely shaped by the contract part-
ners. It is not based on the idea of sanctioning the insurer. The common intent
of the insurance contract partners is the risk transfer in accordance with the
agreed modalities. An insurance contract is an aleatory contract, where the
insurer’s performance reflects the consideration paid via the premium, the calcu-
lation of which is set on the basis of the actuarial insurance technique, taking
into account the risk profile, the statistically expected probability of loss.
Tort liability on the contrary flows from an extra-contractual purely legal rela-
tionship, that in addition to compensation also pursues a goal of sanction,
dissuasion or prevention vis-à-vis reprehensible behaviour, misconduct or
wrongdoing.
Justice Felix Frankfurter considered66:
“Unlike obligations flowing from duties imposed upon people willy-
nilly, an insurance policy is a voluntary undertaking by which obliga-
tions are voluntarily assumed. Therefore the subtleties and sophistries
of tort liability for negligence are not to be applied in construing the
covenants [of an insurance policy]. It is one thing for the law to
impose liability by its own terms of responsibility [as in a tort law
context] and quite another to construe the scope of engagements
bought and paid for [as in an insurance law context]”.
Some Belgian case law seems incompatible with the equivalence system. It
correctly observed that the loss is excluded from cover if one of the co-operative
causes is (the excluded peril of) war. However the assertion that the war peril
must be the direct cause of the loss in order to entail the non-coverage, is not
compatible with the equivalence regime, as it does not contain any such qualifi-
cation of the causal nexus. The assertion is only plausible if the insurance
contract terms and conditions contained such a qualification or if the loss would
have occurred equally pursuant to another cause, in the absence of the act of
war67.
In France transport insurance was held to be governed by the effective and initial
cause rule “la cause effective et première”68, a criterion that may result in a
66 In Standard Oil Co. of N.J. vs. United States, 340 U.S. 54 (1950), 66.
67 See: R. DE SMET, Traité théorique et pratique des assurances maritimes, 324, nr. 313 and 330, nr. 306.
68 P. BRUNAT, Lamy Transport (Paris: Lamy, 1995), I, 4ième partie, Assurance-transport, nr. 664, refer-
ring to Dijon 15 December 1982 in the case GAN vs Docks de Bourgogne.
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contradictory conclusion as the initial cause is not necessarily the effective one
and vice-versa.
In German law69, the “conditio sine qua non” test applies in criminal law, but
the Adäquanztheorie governs civil and insurance law and the British inspired
doctrine, expressed by the maxim “causa proxima, remota non spectatur” is
adopted in marine insurance.
Also in Holland after a contrary opinion70 and despite differing views71, the
question whether the tort liability causation rule is applicable in insurance
contract law was answered negatively by the Dutch Supreme Court72.
For lack of an indication in the law or in the contract, in Holland generally both
the adequate cause and the dominant cause theories are put forward, but also
the theory of the reasonable imputation or attribution is defended in third party
liability insurance and cover of motorcar passengers73, and in addition the
English “causa proxima” theory is argued in property insurance74.
Even in Common Law the application of the famous marine insurance causation
rule of “causa proxima non remota spectatur” as codified in article 55 of the
British Marine Insurance Act 1906, is disputed in other insurance branches and
in tort liability75. The importance of the intention of the insurance contract part-
ners was stressed in this respect.
It is submitted that the application in principle of the equivalence causation
system to (Belgian) insurance contract law with some corrections and adjust-
ments for specific problems would offer a viable and balanced approach.
5.3. Application of the tort liability causation adjustments and 
corrections?
39. The blind and straightforward application of the “conditio sine qua non”
test may in some cases give rise to unfair effects and may therefore require
adjustments and corrections (exceptions, deviations, tempering, mitigation).
69 A. HERDT, Die mehrfache Kausalität im Versicherungsrecht, 81.
70 T. DORHOUT MEES, Schadeverzekeringsrecht (1967), 303.
71 For an overview, see P. VAN HUIZEN, J. WEZEMAN and J. ZEVENBERGEN, Grondslagen Verzekeringsre-
cht, 136, nr. 53.
72 Hoge Raad 8 July 1993, in the case Hogenboom vs Unigarant, NJ 1994, 210.
73 H. BROUWER, “Eigen gebrek en causaliteit in het verzekeringsrecht” in M. HENDRIKSE, P. VAN HUIZEN
and J. RINKES (eds.), Verzekeringsrecht praktisch belicht, Reeks Recht en Praktijk (Deventer: Kluwer,
2nd edition 2008), 323 et seq.
74 T. DORHOUT MEES, Preadvies 1998, 45-46.
75 R. MERKIN, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (1990), 88 and 90; A. MCGEE, The Modern Law of Insur-
ance (London: Butterworths, 2001), 246.
IHT.2018.02.book  Page 216  Wednesday, June 20, 2018  12:47 PM
L A R C I E R    I H T  1 8 / 2
Causation in Transport Insurance
217
If one were to accept that according to Belgian law the tort liability causation
equivalence rule applies to (transport) insurance contract law, the next question
is whether also the same corrections to this rule can be transposed into insurance
contract law, or whether transport insurance cover requires its own specific
adjustments.
The problem areas are i.a. the reserve causes, the alternative causes, the appor-
tionment, etc.
5.3.1. Apportionment
40. One of the questions that arise is whether a distribution, a pro rata76 impu-
tation of the loss to the various concurring causes, is conceivable.
The answer is negative in the pure equivalence system, where causation is a
matter of all or nothing: there is no partial causality (cf. supra section
4.1.1.5.2.).
For the sake of comparison, in a preponderance (dominant cause) regime, the
answer is also negative, save the exceptional case of the totally equivalent effect
of more than one cause on the loss.
In combination with the prevalence of an express exclusion from the cover (cf.
infra section 5.4.), a dominant cause regime may give rise to extreme unfairness,
as is illustrated by the following example. A loss is caused by the combined effect
of 2 causes, viz. e.g. fire and storm with totally equal impact. The insured had
concluded two separate insurance covers that are each other’s mirror image in
the sense that the fire insurance cover excludes storm and the storm insurance
cover excludes fire. The practical consequence will be that the insured will be
deprived of cover under both his contracts, as one of the co-operating causal
factors is expressly excluded in either contract77.
Also in Common law a certain tendency is inclined to apportionment in case
more than one (a covered one and an excluded one) “proximate cause”, equally
contributed to the loss.
In the United Kingdom, the argument of “reasonable expectation” was
advanced in favour of apportionment.
76 Proportional or commensurate.
77 R. MERKIN, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (2010), 183.
IHT.2018.02.book  Page 217  Wednesday, June 20, 2018  12:47 PM
L A R C I E R    I H T  1 8 / 2
Tijdschrift voor Internationale Handel en Transportrecht
218
However in the tort liability equivalence regime the apportionment is excluded
only in the obligatio relationship between the wrongdoers and the victim. In the
contributio relationship between co-tort-feasors or between the tort-feasor and
the victim that committed contributory negligence, this rigorous regime is
corrected78 by allowing an apportionment. Whereas the factual causation rule
leads to joint and several liability of the co-tort feasors in the obligatio relation-
ship, the distribution rule is applied in the contributio relationship between and
amongst the co-tort feasors and also in the relationship between the wrongdoer
and the victim, that committed a contributory negligence.
The legal position of an insurer of one of the co-operative causes of the loss is
however not comparable to the position in tort liability of a victim who commit-
ted contributory negligence and for that reason has to bear part of the loss
himself or to the position of a co-tortfeasor, who has to bear part of the liability
debt (cf. supra section 5.2.).
In other regimes, direct pro rata distribution of the loss amongst the insurers of
the concurring causal factors is conceivable: e.g. the ruling of the Dutch
Supreme Court in the Hogenboom vs Unigarant case79.
Those examples may nevertheless provide an argument for a corrective adjust-
ment towards apportionment of loss amongst the concurring factors also in
(transport) insurance contract law under the equivalence causation regime.
5.3.2. Alternative causation
41. Also the alternative causation is a situation where correction could be justi-
fied.
Alternative causation refers to the case where the loss is without any doubt
caused by one of a group, e.g. a vehicle from a fleet, but where it is not possible
to ascertain which vehicle exactly.
The law addresses such a situation e.g. in the case of road traffic multiple colli-
sion (pile-up), where it is not possible to reconstruct the course of the accident
and to determine liabilities. It imposes the duty to compensate the victim(s) on
the motor third party liability insurers of all motor vehicles involved (art. 19bis-
11 § 1, 7° and § 2 Belgian Motor Third Liability Insurance Act of 21 November
1989).
78 See M. VAN QUICKENBORNE, De Oorzakelijkheid, 366 et seq.
79 Hoge Raad 8 July 1993, NJ 1994, 210.
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5.3.3. Parallel causation
42. As explained above, parallel causation means that several causes were all
independently by themselves sufficient to cause the loss in exactly the same
manner. According to the pure factual causation rule, the respective causes
would mutually lift their causal nexus with the loss, as they are reciprocally not
indispensible to cause the loss, since the other cause is sufficient to cause the
same loss. The reserve cause renders the considered factor dispensable and for
that reason on the basis of the “conditio sine qua non” test non causative (cf.
supra section 4.2.1.).
As parallel causation belongs to the essence of the causation theory, a corrective
adjustment (such as e.g. apportionment) is not self-evident (cf. supra
section 4.1.1.5.2.).
However fairness dictates a solution for this problem.
Although not fully comparable, the deadlock situation created by contractual
“subsidiarity” clauses (“to the extent not covered elsewhere”) in the typical situ-
ation of multiple insurance, is addressed by mandatory enacted law and by case
law.
The situation of double or multiple cover indeed is not totally similar to parallel
causation, as it may either flow from the same peril being covered under both
insurance contracts, or from parallel causes being covered under both contracts.
It illustrates however that enacted law and case law are sensitive to provide for
a solution that lifts the extreme unfairness of deprivation of all insurance cover
for the unreal reason of double insurance.
Mandatory enacted law80 may forbid the application of the subsidiarity clauses
and case law may rule that such clauses cancel each other out81.
Besides the application of the chronology rule in marine insurance82, the solu-
tion advanced in land insurance in such a case consists of proportional appor-
tionment of the onus of the loss83.
80 See e.g. art. 99 Belgian Insurance Act 2014.
81 M. FONTAINE, Verzekeringsrecht, Brussel, Larcier, 2017, p. 512, nr. 607.
82 See art. 12 former Insurance Act 1874, present art. 236 Belgian Insurance Act 2014.
83 See e.g. art. 99 Belgian Insurance Act 2014.
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5.4. Prevalence of the exclusion over the inclusion of cover
43. According to the maxim “specialia generalibus derogant”, a specific exclu-
sion from the cover prevails over the general statutory or contractual definition
of the cover.
Despite the precept of restrictive interpretation of exclusions84, the express
exclusion from the cover of a specifically defined cause of the loss, is considered
to reflect the will of the lawmaker and/or the common intention of the contract
partners to relieve the insurer of his performance duty, even if the excluded cause
co-operated with (an)other covered cause(s) to bring about the loss85.
It is submitted that in order to prevail, an express exclusion from the cover does
not require a qualified causation rule (such as “directly caused by” or “exclu-
sively caused by”). It will also be operative under a non qualified equivalence
regime.
For lack of an express provision or clause to the contrary, there is no indication
that the enacted law or the contract reserve the exclusion of the loss from cover-
age to the cases where such qualified regime of direct or exclusive causation was
enacted in the law or stipulated in the contract.
Of course mandatory law could restrain the effect of this rule when it imposes
the inclusion in the cover of certain perils and leaves the coverage of other perils
to party autonomy.
In case of an indivisible loss, caused by the co-operation of a mandatorily
covered peril and a peril excluded by contract, the insurer will be under a duty
to perform, as contract stipulation cannot infringe the mandatory law.
6. Scenarios
6.1. Effect of the concurrence modality of the loss causing factors
6.1.1. Parallel (reserve causes)
Negative conflict
44. It is recalled that a reserve cause is another factor that is sufficient to create
the same loss as the considered cause (cf. supra section 4.2.1.).
84 M. FONTAINE, Verzekeringsrecht, 371, nr. 483.
85 See Court of Appeal in Midland Mainline Ltd. vs. Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd., Lloyd’s Rep. 2004,
2, 604.
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When the reserve cause is an expressly excluded named peril, arguably the
reserve cause loses its excluding effect for lack of a causal connexion with the
loss, as the considered covered cause is also sufficient to cause the loss.
But in its capacity of reserve cause and irrespective whether named in the policy
or not, it lifts the causal nexus between the loss and the considered covered
cause, which leads to non-coverage.
This effect raises the question whether a correction to the equivalence causation
regime would be appropriate (cf. supra section 5.3.3.).
As opposed to an equivalence system, a causation system that selects a cause on
the basis of its qualified and not merely indispensable nature (dominant, proxi-
mate, direct, last, first, etc) does not give rise to such an outcome.
Positive conflict
45. Two named perils that are both sufficient to cause the same damage, may be
subject to different terms and conditions (e.g. with respect to the deductible, the
cover cap, the type of loss covered, etc.) under the same insurance contract. The
question then arises which regime will prevail to govern the compensation. The
most beneficial policy construction in favour of the insured will flow either from
an express insurance contract stipulation (the “equivalence clause”) or else from
the “contra proferentem” interpretation rule.
If the reserve cause is covered under another insurance contract with another
insurer, the multiple insurance cover regime may apply (cf. supra section 5.3.3.).
6.1.2. Co-operative and consequential causes
46. It is recalled that co-operative causes are indispensible factors that need to
impact together in order to cause the indivisible loss (cf. supra section 4.2.2.).
Consequential causes flow one from another, thereby transforming into another
type of peril (cf. supra section 4.2.3.).
Those co-operative or consequential causes may either be named (defined) (as
covered or as excluded) or not named in the enacted law or the contract (cf.
supra section 4.1.2.2. on the closed categories of causes).
Co-operative causes
47. Several scenarios of co-operating causes are conceivable.
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Two (or more) covered (and therefore named in the contract or in the enacted
law) factors may have co-operated to cause the loss.
Two (or more) excluded (and therefore defined in the contract or in the enacted
law) factors may have co-operated to cause the loss.
Two (or more) undefined (and therefore not covered) factors may have co-oper-
ated to cause the loss.
A covered (and therefore defined) factor may have co-operated with an unde-
fined (and therefore not covered) factor may have co-operated to cause the loss.
A covered (and therefore defined) factor may have co-operated with an
(expressly) excluded factor to cause the loss.
An undefined (and therefore not covered) factor may have co-operated with an
(expressly) excluded factor to cause the loss.
Consequential causes
48. Also in the case of consequential causes, several scenarios are conceivable.
A covered factor may generate another covered factor.
A covered factor may generate another undefined (and therefore not covered)
factor.
A covered factor may generate and excluded factor.
An undefined (and therefore not covered) factor may generate another covered
factor.
An undefined (and therefore not covered) factor may generate another unde-
fined (and therefore not covered) factor.
An undefined (and therefore not covered) factor may generate another excluded
factor.
An excluded factor may generate another covered factor.
An excluded factor may generate another undefined (and therefore not covered)
factor.
An excluded factor may generate another excluded factor.
In some instances the enacted law and/or the contract may regulate the effects
of chain causation, as illustrated by the following examples.
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In transport insurance the contract may stipulate that the damage caused under
the influence of temperature or delay is excluded, unless the temperature or
delay in turn were caused by another covered factor86.
Also delay as a cause of loss is excluded from the cover of the cargo insurance,
unless the delay is caused by an insured peril (cf. art. 11.2.3. Cargo Insurance
Policy of Antwerp 2004).
Article 5.2. of the CMR insurance conditions87 developed by the Belgian Asso-
ciation of Transport Insurers (ABAM-BVT) excludes from the cover: “the liabil-
ity for loss, damage or delay in the delivery of the goods, arising from the influ-
ence of heath, cold, temperature fluctuations or humidity of the air, unless they
flow from a characterised road traffic accident of the vehicle in question or from
fire befallen to its cargo”. For lack of such specification, the exclusion would
apply if in the chain of causation a temperature factor intervened, regardless the
cause of this temperature factor.
6.2. Effect of positive or negative cover definition
49. A argued above, exclusions from the cover prevail over included factors (cf.
supra section 5.4.).
Loss causing factors may be expressly named in the policy, either as covered or
as excluded; When they are not mentioned in the policy, they are in an implied
manner not covered, but also not expressly excluded.
A factor causing the loss, that is outside (i.e. not included in) the cover in an
implied manner, because it is not mentioned in the definition of the cover, does
not entail non-coverage under the equivalence regime, save in the special case it
amounts to a reserve cause (cf. supra sections 4.2.1. and 5.3.3.).
6.3. Effect of the causation rule
50. A relaxed, respectively tightened, causal nexus will have a restrictive or
extensive effect on the insurance cover, according to whether the cover is defined
in a positive or negative manner.
A looser correlation requirement between the loss and the negatively formulated
(exclusion) cover restricts the insurance cover.
86 P. BRUNAT, Lamy Transport, I, 4ième partie, Assurance-transport, nr. 664 and 679.
87 Road cargo carrier contractual liability insurance cover.
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Vice-versa a relaxed nexus requirement between the loss and the positively
formulated (inclusion) cover, broadens the insurance cover.
In other words, a stricter nexus in a positively formulated cover will restrict the
cover and a tighter nexus in a negatively formulated cover will extend the cover.
By way of example reference can be made to the exclusion from the cover of the
loss directly caused by inherent defect (art. 18 former Insurance Act 1874,
present art. 242 Insurance Act 2014): consequently an indivisible loss, caused
by the co-operation of the excluded inherent defect with another covered cause,
is covered (cf. supra section 4.1.2.1.).
E.g. the effect of a non qualified correlation between the loss and an act of war
differs from the effect of a causal link between the loss and the war situation (cf.
supra section 3.2.). In the latter case the loss would not have occurred without
(i.e. for lack of) the war situation. In the former case the loss could also have
happened without the acts of war.
6.4. The matrix of scenarios under the equivalence system
51. The following matrix shows the possible scenarios of combinations of
concurrence of co-operative or consequential factors and their impact on the
insurer’s duty to perform, depending on their defined/undefined and
covered/excluded character.
This matrix indicates that if a cause of loss (in one of its various dimensions,
such as nature, place, time, etc.) is stipulated expressly as excluded by enacted
law or by contract and if it concurs (co-operates with or succeeds) with
(an)other covered cause(s), it will give rise to non-coverage in the equivalence
system, because there is a causal nexus between the loss and the express ground
of exclusion from cover.
If a cause of loss is not expressly included in the cover but also not expressly
excluded from the cover (and hence not named) and if it co-operates with
(an)other covered cause(s), the loss will be covered, because there is a causal
Undefined Covered Excluded
Undefined O X O
Covered X X O
Excluded O O O
Legend: X: cover; O: no cover
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nexus between the loss and the named covered cause(s) of the loss (save maybe
the special case where the unnamed cause amounted to a reserve cause because
it was sufficient all by itself to also generate the same loss).
If e.g. a navigation error had led the vessel into a storm, that caused machinery
breakdown, causing in turn a collision, creating fire on board and if the defini-
tion of the insurance cover does not acknowledge the factors of navigation error
and machinery breakdown, the latter do not negatively affect the cover.
Apportionment?
52. As mentioned before, the all or nothing principle in the equivalence theory
(causation is total and cannot be partial) opposes a pro rata apportionment of the
onus of the compensation amongst the respective co-operating causes of the loss.
The assertion that in the case of concurrence of on the one hand a covered peril
of the sea and on the other hand a characterised fault of the insured, the insurer
is to compensate only the part of the loss that was caused by the peril of the sea,
i.e. for lack of the insured’s fault88, is correct if the loss can be split up in divers
items, that can be attributed respectively to the peril of the sea on the one hand
and to the characterised fault on the other hand. In that case the causal link with
the other cause is lacking. This opinion may create the wrong impression of a
basis for apportionment. When the loss is indivisible, the equivalence theory
exonerates the insurer because the indivisible loss would not have occurred in
the same manner without the insured’s shortcoming. The insured is to bear the
prejudice of the entire loss via forfeiture of cover89.
The attribution of the causation of the loss to the respective factors cannot
provide the basis for an apportionment of the coverage of the loss when some
co-operative factors are covered and others are not.
There may be case for correction/adjustment of the pure equivalence rule so as
to accommodate an apportionment for co-operative causes of the loss90 (cf.
supra section 5.3.1.).
88 X., “De Zeeverzekeringswet: Belgische Wet van 1879” in J. ANDRE DUMONT, C. DEVOET and others
(eds.), Kluwer’s Verzekeringshandboek (Berchem: Kluwer, 2008), I-16.2-11; R. DE SMET, Traité
théorique et pratique des assurances maritimes, 288, nr. 272.
89 This is also Ripert’s opinion: see G. RIPERT, Droit Maritime III, 661, nr. 2683.
90 Cf. M. HUYBRECHTS, in D. Thomas (ed.), Marine Insurance: the law in transition, Chapter 8, 173; M.
HUYBRECHTS, “A San Andreas fault between the Common Law and the Civil Law”, in E. VAN HOOY-
DONK, (ed.), English and Continental Maritime Law (Antwerp: Maklu, 2003, 138).
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6.5. In qualified causation systems
Dominant cause systems
53. In the Common Law causa proxima and other dominant cause (“causa
causans”) systems, when the causal tree of a loss comprises both a covered cause
and a non-covered cause, the loss will be covered or not depending on whether
the proximate cause is the covered cause or the non-covered cause.
If the proximate cause is not mentioned as covered in the policy, the loss will not
be covered.
If the proximate cause is mentioned as covered in the policy, the loss will be
covered.
It is the logical result of a causation system that takes into account the dominant
cause, based on a gradation of causality as opposed to the precept of equivalence
of causes in the equivalence theory.
This proximate cause rule is general and applies to all modalities of concurrence
of causes in Common Law insurance law.
The special situation where all (2 or more) causes are absolutely equivalent
because they all have exactly to the same extent contributed to the loss, is
addressed hereinafter (see below on apportionment). In that case the loss will be
covered if one of the causes is included in the cover and the other causes are not
expressly excluded from the cover91.
Apportionment?
54. Also in dominant cause regimes the apportionment between co-operative
causes is considered problematic, because it implies a degree of equivalence of
the causes, which is incompatible with the rationale of the system that selects the
preponderant cause.
Another motive for the reluctance to apply an apportionment is the difficulty to
assess the degree of proportional contribution of the respective causes to the
loss.
91 See M. CLARKE, The Law of Insurance Contracts (London: LLP, 1997), nr. 25-6A and MACGILLIVRAY
& COLINVAUX, On Insurance Law (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 9th edition 1997), nr. 19-5; R. MERK-
ING, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance, 89; S. HODGES, Law of Marine Insurance, 152.
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Exceptionally the Common Law “causa proxima” doctrine admits the possibil-
ity that multiple co-operative (referred to as “concurrent”) causes may be prox-
imate and thus be causative of the loss.
This possibility is exceptional as multiple “proximate causes” of a loss is in
principle a “contradictio in terminis”, since by definition only one dominant
cause is conceivable.
Multiple “proximate causes” are only conceivable when they are absolutely
equivalent because they all (2 or more) have exactly to the same extent contrib-
uted to the loss92.
Other causation systems
55. In other causation systems: e.g. in Holland there is a controversy with
respect to the effect of co-operative causes93. According to one opinion only the
dominant cause (the most effective or the main cause) can be taken into account
and only exceptionally an apportionment and only in equal parts can be applied,
viz. only in the case the respective causes contributed equally to the loss.
According to another view an apportionment must be applied commensurately
with the exact contribution of the respective co-operative causes to the loss.
The Dutch Supreme Court ruled in favour of the apportionment (cf. supra
section 5.3.1.).
6.6. The interaction between definition and forfeiture of cover
56. Although in the normal order the coverage test precedes the forfeiture test
(cf. supra section 5.1.), in some instances a concurrence of on the one hand an
exclusion of cover and on the other hand a ground for forfeiture of cover, is
conceivable.
Parallel cause
57. In case of a covered cause, that is sufficient to effect the loss, concurring with
a ground for forfeiture of cover, the same reasoning applies as for the delimita-
92 S. HODGES, Law of Marine Insurance, 152; see the comments of P. VAN HUIZEN, Het transportverze-
keringsbedrijf (Apeldoorn, Maklu, 1988), 158; contra: H. BROUWER in M. HENDRIKSE, P. VAN HUIZEN
and J. RINKES (eds.), Verzekeringsrecht praktisch belicht, 327-328.
93 See T. DORHOUT MEES, Preadvies 1998, 47; T. DORHOUT MEES, Het nieuwe verzekeringsrecht (1987),
83, nr. 202.
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tion of the cover (inclusion-exclusion) (cf. supra section 6.1.1.). It will lift the
causal nexus between the loss and the ground for forfeiture.
On the other hand if the breach of contract duty was sufficient to cause the loss,
in its capacity of parallel reserve cause, it will lift the causal nexus between the
loss and the covered cause, resulting in non-coverage.
Consequential cause
58. In case the original breach of an insurance contract duty that qualifies as a
ground for forfeiture of the insurance cover, generates another covered event,
the consequential cause will be irrelevant, as the original cause does not lose its
causal character. E.g. in motor third party liability insurance drunken driving
(ground for forfeiture) causes speeding (a covered traffic regulations violation).
Co-operative causes
59. As explained above, the relationship between the insurer and the insured is
not comparable to that of between a tortfeasor and a victim (cf. supra
section 5.2.). The insurer is not the tortfeasor and the insured is not the victim.
On the contrary in the case of a breach of a contractual duty (gross negligence,
intentional act, etc.), the insured is the wrongdoer and the insurer the prejudiced
party.
Apportionment?
60. For the reason given above (cf. supra section 4.1.1.5.2.), under the rule of
the equivalence regime apportionment on the basis of the contribution between
co-tortfeasors or between the tortfeasor and the victim, who committed contrib-
utory negligence, is not possible.
When a loss was caused by the co-operation of the insured’s qualified shortcom-
ing and another covered cause, the forfeiture will be total, as under the equiva-
lence regime there is no legal ground for apportionment.
Specific insurance contract law
61. Specific insurance contract law may govern the forfeiture effect of the
insured’s breach of contractual duty (e.g; art. 65 Belgian Insurance Act 2014).
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6.7. Inherent vice
62. Arguably, where appropriate, inherent vice is to be qualified as a case of
exclusion of cover and not of forfeiture of cover94.
Under the rule of the equivalence regime a threefold distinction can be made
with respect to inherent vice.
Firstly on the assumption that neither the enacted insurance contract law provi-
sions nor the insurance contract clauses address the issue, the co-operation of
the inherent vice with a covered peril would not exclude the loss from cover.
The predisposition of the thing damaged or destroyed is irrelevant for the insur-
ance cover generated by another co-operative cause.
Only when the inherent vice amounts to a parallel (reserve) cause, it affects the
causal nexus between the covered peril and the loss and hence it neutralizes the
cover.
Secondly when the enacted law or the contract expressly define the inherent vice
as a ground for exclusion from cover, the co-operation of a covered cause with
the excluded inherent vice results in non-coverage of the loss.
Thirdly in the case of art. 18 former Insurance Act 1874 (present art. 242 Insur-
ance Act 2014), that excludes the loss from the cover only if it was exclusively
caused the inherent defect (cf. supra sectop, 4.1.2.1.), the co-operation of a
covered cause with an inherent vice results in a covered loss.
If the inherent vice was in its turn caused by a covered cause, under the rule of
article 18 Insurance Act 1874, the insurer shall be held to bear the entire loss95.
The deterioration of the cargo (as a form of inherent vice “in genere”), due to
the delay in the transportation, is not to be borne by the insurer since delay as
such as a cause of loss normally is not covered in the delimitation of the cover
(delay is not a peril of the sea).
The outcome would be different in case the delay in its turn was caused by a
covered cause96.
As explained before (cf. supra section 4.1.1.5.2.) apportionment is not possible
in the equivalence system. Only when the loss is divisible (e.g. aggravation of the
94 C. SMEESTERS and G. WINKELMOLEN, Droit maritime et droit fluvial (Brussels: Larcier, 2nd edition
1938), III, 129, nr. 1027.
95 C. BUISSERET, “Assurances maritimes”, RPDB, Complément, III, 179, nr. 662.
96 R. DE SMET, Traité théorique et pratique des assurances maritimes, 306, nr. 289.
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loss due to the inherent vice), the loss can be apportioned and the insurer shall
be held to compensate only the part of the loss that is not due to the inherent
vice.
The case law97 that rules as follows is correct, if it relates to divisible loss98.
“Si le vice propre est provoqué ou aggravé par un risque garanti par
l’assurance, l’assureur est tenu pour le tout dans le premier cas, pour
partie dans le second”.
7. Conclusion
The findings from this analysis allow to somewhat structure the subject matter.
The combination of the modality of concurrence of causes, the causation rule,
the positive or negative cover definition, the characterisation of the causation or
other circumstantial correlations determine to a large extent the causation in
(transport) insurance.
In some legal systems, there is a need for a more (better) elaborated doctrine on
causation in insurance contract law.
Some (more) attention for the issue by the legislator could help avoiding uncer-
tainties.
In transport insurance, being to a large extent characterised by party autonomy,
also the contract partners could anticipate the problem by (better) filling in the
blank norm of causation in their contract.
The equivalence theory provides a workable option to fill in the blank causation
norm in (Civil Law or at least Belgian) transport insurance contract law.
In that case, a few corrections to the pure regime are recommended.
Although it presents a few flaws, the equivalence system provides a transparent
regime with predictable outcome and less grey areas than other causation
systems99. It offers more legal certainty than other causation regimes. The price
for nuance is indeed paid with loss of legal certainty. 
97 Brussels 30 November 1928, RHA, 1928, 481; C. SMEESTERS and G. WINKELMOLEN, Droit maritime
et droit fluvial, III, 133, nr. 1029.
98 R. DE SMET, Droit Maritime et droit fluvial belges, II, 887, nr. 772.
99 M. VAN QUICKENBORNE, Oorzakelijk verband tussen onrechtmatige daad en schade, 27, nr. 35.
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